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Abstract
Several security models of multiple-access channel (MAC) are investigated. First, we study the degraded MAC with
confidential messages, where two users transmit their confidential messages (no common message) to a destination,
and each user obtains a degraded version of the output of the MAC. Each user views the other user as a eavesdropper,
and wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the other user. Measuring each user’s uncertainty
about the other user’s confidential message by equivocation, the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation
region for this model have been provided. The result is further explained via the binary and Gaussian examples.
Second, the discrete memoryless multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) is studied, where two users trans-
mit their corresponding confidential messages (no common message) to a legitimate receiver, while an additional
wiretapper wishes to obtain the messages via a wiretap channel. This new model is considered into two cases:
the general MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, and the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders. The
capacity-equivocation region is totally determined for the cooperative case, and inner and outer bounds on the capacity-
equivocation region are provided for the non-cooperative case. For both cases, the results are further explained via
the binary examples.
Index Terms
Confidential message, capacity-equivocation region, Gaussian MAC, multiple-access channel (MAC), secrecy
capacity region, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transmission of confidential messages has been studied in the literature of several classes of channels. Wyner,
in his well-known paper on the wiretap channel [1], studied the problem that how to transmit the confidential
messages to the legitimate receiver via a degraded broadcast channel, while keeping the wiretapper as ignorant of
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2the messages as possible. Measuring the uncertainty of the wiretapper by equivocation, the capacity-equivocation
region was established. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity was also established, which provided the maximum
transmission rate with perfect secrecy. After the publication of Wyner’s work, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] investigated a
more general situation: the broadcast channels with confidential messages (BCC). In this model, a common message
and a confidential message were sent through a general broadcast channel. The common message was assumed to be
decoded correctly by the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper, while the confidential message was only allowed to
be obtained by the legitimate receiver. This model is also a generalization of [3], where no confidentiality condition
is imposed. The capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region of BCC [2] were totally determined,
and the results were also a generalization of those in [1]. Based on Wyner’s work, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman
studied the Gaussian wiretap channel(GWC) [4], and showed that its secrecy capacity was the difference between
the main channel capacity and the overall wiretap channel capacity (the cascade of main channel and wiretap
channel). Some other related works on the wiretap channel (including feedback, side information and secret key)
can be found in [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10].
Recently, the information-theoretical security for other multi-user communication systems has been investigated.
The relay channel with confidential messages was studied in [11], and the interference channel with confidential
messages was studied in [12]. For the multiple-access channel, the security problems are split into two directions.
The first is that two users wish to transmit their corresponding messages to a destination, and meanwhile, they
also receive the channel output. Each user treats the other user as a wiretapper, and wishes to keep its confidential
message as secret as possible from the wiretapper. This model is usually called the MAC with confidential messages,
and it was studied by [13], see Figure 1. An inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is provided for the
model of Figure 1, and the capacity-equivocation region is still not known. Furthermore, for the model of MAC with
one confidential message [13], both inner and outer bounds on capacity-equivocation region are derived. Moreover,
for the degraded MAC with one confidential message, the capacity-equivocation region is totally determined.
Fig. 1: MAC with confidential messages
3The second is that an additional wiretapper has access to the MAC output via a wiretap channel, and therefore,
how to keep the confidential messages of the two users as secret as possible from the additional wiretapper is the
main concern of the system designer. This model is usually called the multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT).
The Gaussian MAC-WT was investigated by [14], see Figure 2. An inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region
is provided for the Gaussian MAC-WT. Other related works on MAC-WT can be found in [15], [16].
Fig. 2: Gaussian multiple-access wiretap channel
In this paper, firstly we study a special case of Figure 1, where two users wish to transmit their confidential
messages (no common message) to a destination, and meanwhile, they also receive a degraded version of the
channel output, see Figure 3. Each user wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the other
user. Measuring each user’s uncertainty about the other one’s confidential message by equivocation, the inner and
outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided for this model. Then, as examples, we establish the
inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions for the Gaussian and binary cases of Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Degraded MAC with confidential messages
Secondly we study the discrete memoryless multiple-access wiretap channel (MAC-WT), see Figure 4. The model
of Figure 4 is considered into two cases: MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, and degraded MAC-WT with non-
cooperative encoders. For the MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, the capacity-equivocation region is determined.
4Furthermore, if the received symbols for the wiretapper is a degraded version of the symbols for the legitimate
receiver (usually called degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders), we also establish the capacity-equivocation
region for this special case. For the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, inner and outer bounds on
the capacity-equivocation region are provided. Finally, as examples, we give the capacity-equivocation region for
the binary degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, and the secrecy capacity region for the binary degraded
MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders.
Fig. 4: Multiple-access wiretap channel with cooperative (or non-cooperative) encoders
In this paper, random variab1es, sample values and alphabets are denoted by capital letters, lower case letters
and calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample values.
For example, UN denotes a random N -vector (U1, ..., UN ), and uN = (u1, ..., uN ) is a specific vector value
in UN that is the N th Cartesian power of U . UNi denotes a random N − i + 1-vector (Ui, ..., UN ), and
uNi = (ui, ..., uN ) is a specific vector value in UNi . Let pV (v) denote the probability mass function Pr{V = v}.
Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy
capacity region of the model of Figure 3 are determined in Theorem 1 and Remark 1, respectively. Then, as two
examples, the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian and binary cases of
Figure 3 are shown in Section III. In Section IV, the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region
for the model of Figure 4 with cooperative encoders are determined in Theorem 7 and Remark 3, respectively. The
results of the degraded case for the model of Figure 4 with cooperative encoders are also shown in Section IV.
The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region for the model of Figure 4 with non-cooperative
encoders are shown in Section V. In Section VI, we will show the binary examples about the model of Figure 4
with cooperative or non-cooperative encoders. Final conclusions are provided in Section VII.
II. DEGRADED MAC WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, a description of the model of Figure 3 is given by Definition 1 to Definition 3. The capacity-
equivocation region R(A) composed of all achievable (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) tuples in the model of Figure 3 is
characterized in Theorem 1, where the achievable (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) tuple is defined in Definition 4.
5Definition 1: (Encoders) The confidential messages W1 and W2 take values in W1 and W2, respectively. W1
and W2 are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. Since each encoder is a wiretapper for the
other encoder, the cooperation between the encoders is not allowed. The input and output of encoder 1 are W1 and
XN1 , respectively. Similarly, the input and output of encoder 2 are W2 and X
N
2 , respectively. We assume that the
encoders are stochastic encoders, i.e., the encoder fNi (i = 1, 2) is a matrix of conditional probabilities f
N
i (x
N
i |wi),
where xNi ∈ XNi , wi ∈ Wi, and fNi (xNi |wi) is the probability that the message wi is encoded as the channel input
xNi . Note that W1 and X
N
2 are independent, and W2 is independent of X
N
1 .
The transmission rates of the confidential messages are log‖W1‖N and
log‖W2‖
N .
Definition 2: (Channels) The MAC is a DMC with finite input alphabet X1 ×X2, finite output alphabet Y , and
transition probability Q1(y|x1, x2), where x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, y ∈ Y . Q1(yN |xN1 , xN2 ) =
∏N
n=1Q1(yn|x1,n, x2,n).
The inputs of the MAC are XN1 and X
N
2 , while the output is Y
N .
User i (i = 1, 2) has access to the output of the MAC via channel i. Channel i is a DMC with input Y N and
output Y Ni . User 2’s equivocation about W1 is defined as
∆1 =
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 ,W2, XN2 )
(a)
=
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 , XN2 ), (2.1)
and user 1’s equivocation about W2 is defined as
∆2 =
1
N
H(W2|Y N1 ,W1, XN1 )
(b)
=
1
N
H(W2|Y N1 , XN1 ), (2.2)
where (a) and (b) are from W2 → (Y N2 , XN2 )→W1 and W1 → (Y N1 , XN1 )→W2.
Definition 3: (Decoder) The decoder is a mapping fD : YN →W1 ×W2, with input Y N and outputs Ŵ1, Ŵ2.
Let Pe be the error probability of the receiver , and it is defined as Pr{(W1,W2) 6= (Ŵ1, Ŵ2)}.
Definition 4: (Achievable (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) tuple in the model of Figure 3) A tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) (where
R1, R2, Re1, Re2 > 0) is called achievable if, for any  > 0 (where  is an arbitrary small positive real number and
→ 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆1,∆2, Pe) such that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W2 ‖
N
= R2, lim
N→∞
∆1 ≥ Re1, lim
N→∞
∆2 ≥ Re2, Pe ≤ . (2.3)
The capacity-equivocation region R(A) is a set composed of all achievable (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) tuples. The
inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R(A) are provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem
2, respectively, and they are proved in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Theorem 1: (Inner bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ai) is as follows,
R(Ai) = {(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) : 0 ≤ Re1 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ Re2 ≤ R2,
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2),
6Re2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Y1|X1),
Re1 +Re2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X2;Y1|X1),
Re1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2),
Re2 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1)},
where (X1, X2)→ Y → (Y1, Y2) and R(Ai) ⊆ R(A).
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• The region R(A) is convex, and the proof is directly obtained by introducing a time sharing random variable
into Theorem 1, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
• Note that Theorem 1 indicates a tradeoff between the two equivocations Re1 and Re2, i.e., Re1 + Re2 ≤
I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X2;Y1|X1).
• The achievable secrecy region C(Ai)s is the set of pairs (R1, R2) such that (R1, R2, Re1 = R1, Re2 = R2) ∈
R(Ai).
Corollary 1:
C(Ai)s = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Y1|X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2)− I(X2;Y1|X1)}.
Proof: Corollary 1 is easy to be checked by substituting Re1 = R1 and Re2 = R2 into R(Ai).
Theorem 2: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R(Ao) is as follows,
R(Ao) = {(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) : 0 ≤ Re1 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ Re2 ≤ R2,
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2),
Re2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Y1|X1)},
where (X1, X2)→ Y → (Y1, Y2) and R(A) ⊆ R(Ao).
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 2, see the following.
• The region R(A) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The outer bound C(Ao)s on the secrecy capacity region is the set of pairs (R1, R2) such that (R1, R2, Re1 =
R1, Re2 = R2) ∈ R(Ao).
7Corollary 2:
C(Ao)s = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Y1|X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )}.
Proof: Corollary 2 is easy to be checked by substituting Re1 = R1 and Re2 = R2 into R(Ao).
III. GAUSSIAN AND BINARY MACS WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
A. The Gaussian Case of the Model of Figure 3
In this subsection, we study the Gaussian case of Figure 3, where the channel input-output relationships at each
time instant i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) are given by
Yi = X1,i +X2,i + Zi, (3.4)
Y1,i = X1,i +X2,i + Zi + Z1,i, (3.5)
and
Y2,i = X1,i +X2,i + Zi + Z2,i, (3.6)
where Zi ∼ N (0, N0), Z1,i ∼ N (0, N1) and Z2,i ∼ N (0, N2). The random vectors ZN , ZN1 and ZN2 are
independent with i.i.d. components. The channel inputs XN1 and X
N
2 are subject to the average power constraints
P1 and P2, respectively, i.e.,
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X21,i] ≤ P1,
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X22,i] ≤ P2. (3.7)
The following Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region
of Gaussian MAC with confidential messages.
Theorem 3: For the Gaussian case of Figure 3, the inner bound R(Bi) on the capacity-equivocation region R(B)
8is given by
R(Bi) =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + βP2N0 )
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β)P1P2
N0
)
0 ≤ Re1 ≤ R1
0 ≤ Re2 ≤ R2
Re1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )
Re2 ≤ 12 log(1 + βP2N0 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
)
Re1 +Re2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
)
Re1 +Re2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
)
Re1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )
Re2 +R1 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + βP2N0+N1 ).

.
(3.8)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Corollary 3: The inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 3 is
C(Bi)s =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2) :
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
)
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
)
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + βP2N0 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
).

.
(3.9)
Proof: Substituting Re1 = R1 and Re2 = R2 into the region R(Bi) in Theorem 3, Corollary 3 is easily
obtained.
The inner bound on the secrecy capacity C(Bi)s (R2) as a function of R2 is
C(Bi)s (R2) = max
α
min

1
2 log(1 +
αP1
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 ),
1
2 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )− 12 log(1 +
β∗P2
N0+N1
)−R2,
1
2 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β∗)P1P2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )− 12 log(1 +
β∗P2
N0+N1
)−R2,

(3.10)
where β∗ is determined by the following equation:
1
2
log(1 +
β∗P2
N0
)− 1
2
log(1 +
β∗P2
N0 +N1
) = R2. (3.11)
Proof: The proof of (3.10) follows directly from Corollary 3.
Theorem 4: For the Gaussian case of Figure 3, the outer bound R(Bo) on the capacity-equivocation region R(B)
9is given by
R(Bo) =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + βP2N0 )
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β)P1P2
N0
)
Re1 ≤ R1
Re2 ≤ R2
Re1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )
Re2 ≤ 12 log(1 + βP2N0 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
).

. (3.12)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Corollary 4: The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian case of Figure 3 is
C(Bo)s =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2) :
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β)P1P2
N0
)
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 )
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 + βP2N0 )− 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0+N1
).

. (3.13)
Proof: Substituting Re1 = R1 and Re2 = R2 into the region R(Bo) in Theorem 4, Corollary 4 is easily
obtained.
The outer bound on the secrecy capacity C(Bo)s (R2) as a function of R2 is
C(Bo)s (R2) = max
α
min

1
2 log(1 +
αP1
N0
)− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 ),
1
2 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−α)P1P2
N0
)−R2,
1
2 log(1 +
P1+P2+2
√
(1−β∗)P1P2
N0
)−R2,
 (3.14)
where β∗ is determined by the following equation:
1
2
log(1 +
β∗P2
N0
)− 1
2
log(1 +
β∗P2
N0 +N1
) = R2. (3.15)
Proof: The proof of (3.14) follows directly from Corollary 4.
Figure 5 plots the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian case of Figure 3 for three
values of N1 and N2. The lines of C
(Bi)
s (R2) and C
(Bo)
s (R2) also serve as the boundaries of the inner and outer
bounds on the secrecy capacity regions if we view the vertical axis as R1. It is easy to see that as N1 and N2
increase, which implies that the noise level of the wiretap channels to both users increases, both users become more
confused by the channel outputs. Thus, the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region enlarge.
B. The Binary Case of the Model of Figure 3
In this subsection, we study the following binary case of Figure 3. Assume that all channel inputs and outputs
take values in {0, 1}, and the channels are discrete memoryless. The input-output relationship of the channels at
10
Fig. 5: Inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity regions of the Gaussian case of Figure 3 and capacity region
of corresponding Gaussian MAC, where P1 = 100, P2 = 200 and N0 = 1.
each time instant satisfies
Yi = X1,i ·X2,i, Y1,i = Yi ⊕ Z1,i, Y2,i = Yi ⊕ Z2,i, (3.16)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and ZN1 , ZN2 are composed of N i.i.d. random variables with distributions Pr{Z1,i = 1} = p
and Pr{Z2,i = 1} = q, respectively. Let 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 12 .
The following Theorem 6 and Theorem 5 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region
of the binary MAC with confidential messages.
Theorem 5: For the binary case of Figure 3, the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region R(C) is given
11
by
R(Ci) =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ Re1 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ Re2 ≤ R2
Re1 ≤ h(q)
Re2 ≤ h(p)
Re1 +Re2 ≤ h(p) + h(q)− 1
Re1 +R2 ≤ h(q)
Re2 +R1 ≤ h(p)

, (3.17)
where h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p), and h(q) = −q log(q)− (1− q) log(1− q).
Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollary 5: The inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of Figure 3 is
C(Ci)s =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1
 (R1, R2) :
R1 +R2 ≤ h(p) + h(q)− 1
R1 ≤ h(q)
R2 ≤ h(p)
 . (3.18)
Proof: Substituting Re1 = R1 and Re2 = R2 into the region R(Ci) in Theorem 5, Corollary 5 is easily
obtained.
Theorem 6: For the binary case of Figure 3, the outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region R(C) is given
by
R(Co) =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1

(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ Re1 ≤ R1, 0 ≤ Re2 ≤ R2
Re1 ≤ h(q)
Re2 ≤ h(p)

, (3.19)
where h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p), and h(q) = −q log(q)− (1− q) log(1− q).
Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollary 6: The outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of Figure 3 is
C(Co)s =
⋃
0≤α≤1,0≤β≤1
 (R1, R2) :
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
R1 ≤ h(q)
R2 ≤ h(p)
 . (3.20)
Proof: Substituting Re1 = R1 and Re2 = R2 into the region R(Co) in Theorem 5, Corollary 6 is easily
obtained.
Figure 6 plots the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity of the binary case of Figure 3 for h(q) = 0.6
and h(p) = 0.8. Note that p and q are the cross-over probabilities of the wiretap channels to both users, and as p
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Fig. 6: Inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of Figure 3
and q increase, both users become more and more confused by the channel outputs. When p = q = 12 , the inner
and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region are the same as the capacity region of the MAC.
IV. MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH COOPERATIVE ENCODERS
In this section, a description of the model of Figure 4 is given by Definition 5 to Definition 7. The capacity-
equivocation region R(D) composed of all achievable (R1, R2, Re) triples in the model of Figure 4 is characterized
in Theorem 7, where the achievable (R1, R2, Re) triple is defined in Definition 8. The capacity-equivocation region
of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders is given in Theorem 8.
Definition 5: (Cooperative encoders) The confidential messages W1 and W2 take values in W1 and W2,
respectively. W1 and W2 are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. The inputs of the two
encoders are W1 and W2, while the output of encoder 1 is XN1 and the output of encoder 2 is X
N
2 . We assume
that the encoders are stochastic encoders, i.e., the encoder gNi (i = 1, 2) is a matrix of conditional probabilities
gNi (x
N
i |w1, w2), where xNi ∈ XNi , wi ∈ Wi, and gNi (xNi |w1, w2) is the probability that the messages w1 and w2
are encoded as the channel input xNi . Note that XN1 and XN2 are not independent.
The transmission rates of the confidential messages are log‖W1‖N and
log‖W2‖
N .
Definition 6: (Channel) The MAC-WT is a DMC with finite input alphabet X1 × X2, finite output alphabet
Y × Z , and transition probability Q1(y, z|x1, x2), where x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z . Q1(yN , zN |xN1 , xN2 ) =∏N
n=1Q1(yn, zn|x1,n, x2,n). The inputs of the channel are XN1 and XN2 , while the outputs are Y N and ZN .
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The wiretapper’s equivocation to the confidential messages W1 and W2 is defined as
∆ =
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ). (4.1)
Definition 7: (Decoder) The decoder is a mapping fD : YN →W1 ×W2, with input Y N and outputs Ŵ1, Ŵ2.
Let Pe be the error probability of the receiver , and it is defined as Pr{(W1,W2) 6= (Ŵ1, Ŵ2)}.
Definition 8: (Achievable (R1, R2, Re) triple in the model of Figure 4) A triple (R1, R2, Re) (where R1, R2, Re >
0) is called achievable if, for any  > 0 (where  is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists
a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe) such that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ W1 ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
log ‖ W2 ‖
N
= R2, lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ Re, Pe ≤ . (4.2)
Theorem 7 gives a single-letter characterization of the set R(D), which is composed of all achievable
(R1, R2, Re) triples in the model of Figure 4, and it is proved in Appendix E and Appendix F.
Theorem 7: A single-letter characterization of the region R(D) is as follows,
R(D) = {(R1, R2, Re) : Re ≤ R1 +R2,
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y ),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)},
where (U,U1, U2)→ V → (X1, X2)→ (Y,Z), and U , U1, U2 may be assumed to be (deterministic) functions of
V .
Remark 3: There are some notes on Theorem 7, see the following.
• The region R(D) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U , U1, U2 and V satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1,
‖U1‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖,
‖U2‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖,
‖V‖ ≤ (‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1)2‖X1‖2‖X2‖2.
The proof is in Appendix G.
• The secrecy capacity region C(D)s is the set of pairs (R1, R2) such that (R1, R2, Re = R1 +R2) ∈ R(D).
Corollary 7:
C(D)s = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2),
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)}.
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Proof: Corollary 7 is easy to be checked by substituting Re = R1 +R2 into R(D).
For the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, i.e., (W1,W2)→ (X1, X2)→ Y → Z, the capacity-
equivocation region R(E) is given in the following Theorem 8, and it is proved in Appendix H.
Theorem 8: A single-letter characterization of the region R(E) for the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative
encoders is as follows,
R(E) = {(R1, R2, Re) : Re ≤ R1 +R2,
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2),
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y ),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)},
where (U1, U2)→ V → (X1, X2)→ (Y,Z), and U1, U2 may be assumed to be (deterministic) functions of V .
Remark 4: There are some notes on Theorem 8, see the following.
• For the degraded case, the last bound in Theorem 8 can be obtained from the corresponding bound of Theorem
7, see the following.
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
= I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)− (I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z))
≤ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z). (4.3)
Therefore, the converse proof of Theorem 8 is directly obtained from that of Theorem 7 and the above (4.3).
• The region R(E) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U1, U2 and V satisfy
‖U1‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖,
‖U2‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖,
‖V‖ ≤ (‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1)‖X1‖2‖X2‖2.
The proof is similar to Appendix G, and it is omitted here.
• The secrecy capacity region C(E)s is the set of pairs (R1, R2) such that (R1, R2, Re = R1 +R2) ∈ R(E).
Corollary 8:
C(E)s = {(R1, R2) : R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2),
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)}.
Proof: Corollary 8 is easy to be checked by substituting Re = R1 +R2 into R(E)
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V. DEGRADED MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH NON-COOPERATIVE ENCODERS
In this section, we will present inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation of the degraded MAC-WT
with non-cooperative encoders. For the non-cooperative model, the input of encoder 1 is W1, while the output of
encoder 1 is XN1 . Similarly, the input and output of encoder 2 are W2 and X
N
2 , respectively. The encoders are
stochastic encoders, i.e., the encoder g∗Ni (i = 1, 2) is a matrix of conditional probabilities g
∗N
i (x
N
i |wi), where
xNi ∈ XNi , wi ∈ Wi, and g∗Ni (xNi |wi) is the probability that the message wi is encoded as the channel input xNi .
Note that XN1 and X
N
2 are independent.
The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R(F) of the degraded MAC-WT with
non-cooperative encoders are provided in Theorem 9 and Theorem 10, respectively, and they are proved in
Appendix I and Appendix J.
Theorem 9: (Inner bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R(G) is as follows,
R(G) = L(1)
⋃
L(2)
⋃
L(3)
⋃
L(4),
where
L(1) =

(R1, R2, Re) :
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )
Re ≤ R1 +R2
Re ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1) +R1

,
L(2) =

(R1, R2, Re) :
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )
Re ≤ R1 +R2
Re ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z|X2) +R2

,
L(3) =

(R1, R2, Re) :
I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z) ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y )
I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1) ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )
Re ≤ R1 +R2
Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

,
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L(4) =

(R1, R2, Re) :
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z|X2) ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)
I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Z) ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y )
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )
Re ≤ R1 +R2
Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

,
and X1, X2, Y and Z satisfy (X1, X2)→ Y → Z, and R(G) ⊆ R(F).
Remark 5: There are some notes on Theorem 9, see the following.
• The region R(G) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• The secrecy capacity region C(F )s is the set of pairs (R1, R2) such that (R1, R2, Re = R1 +R2) ∈ R(F).
Corollary 9: (Inner bound on secrecy capacity region) The secrecy capacity region C(F )s satisfies C(G)s ⊆
C(F )s , where
C(G)s =

(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1)

⋃

(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z|X2)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Z)
 .
Proof: Corollary 9 is easy to be checked by substituting Re = R1 +R2 into R(G).
Theorem 10: (Outer bound) A single-letter characterization of the region R(H) is as follows,
R(H) =

(R1, R2, Re) :
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )
Re ≤ R1 +R2
Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

,
where X1, X2, Y and Z satisfy (X1, X2)→ Y → Z, and R(F) ⊆ R(H).
Remark 6: There are some notes on Theorem 10, see the following.
• The region R(H) is convex. The proof is omitted here.
• Corollary 10: (Outer bound on secrecy capacity region) The secrecy capacity region C(F )s satisfies C(F )s ⊆
C(H)s , where
C(H)s =

(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)

.
Proof: Corollary 10 is easy to be checked by substituting Re = R1 +R2 into R(H).
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Fig. 7: The inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region C(F )s , and the capacity region of the MAC,
where A = I(X1;Y |X2), B = I(X1;Y ) − I(X1;Z), C = I(X1;Y |X2) − I(X1;Z|X2), D = I(X2;Y |X1),
E = I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Z) and F = I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1).
To understand the relationship of the inner bound C(G)s , the outer bound C(H)s and the capacity region of the
MAC, we plot Figure 7 for illustration.
VI. BINARY DEGRADED MAC-WT WITH COOPERATIVE (OR NON-COOPERATIVE) ENCODERS
A. The Binary Case of the Degraded MAC-WT with Cooperative Encoders
In this subsection, we study the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders. Assume that
all channel inputs and outputs take values in {0, 1}, and the channels are discrete memoryless. The input-output
relationship of the channels at each time instant satisfies
Yi = X1,i ·X2,i, Zi = Yi ⊕ Z∗i , (6.1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and Z∗N is composed of N i.i.d. random variables with distribution Pr{Z∗i = 1} = p and
Pr{Z∗i = 0} = 1− p. Let 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 .
Theorem 11: For the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, the capacity-equivocation
region R(I) is given by
R(I) =

(R1, R2, Re) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1
R1 +R2 ≤ 1
Re ≤ R1 +R2
Re ≤ h(p)

, (6.2)
where h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p).
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Proof: By calculating the mutual information terms in Theorem 8, Theorem 11 is easy to be checked, and
therefore, the proof is omitted here.
Corollary 11: The secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders
is
C(I)s =
 (R1, R2) :
R1 +R2 ≤ h(p)
R1 ≤ 1
R2 ≤ 1
 . (6.3)
Proof: Substituting Re = R1 +R2 into the region R(I) in Theorem 11, Corollary 11 is easily obtained.
Fig. 8: The secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders, and
the capacity region of the binary MAC
Figure 8 shows the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative
encoders, and the capacity region of the binary MAC. It is easy to see that as p→ 12 , the secrecy capacity region
tends to be the capacity region of the binary MAC.
B. The Binary Case of the Degraded MAC-WT with Non-Cooperative Encoders
In this subsection, we study the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders. Assume
that all channel inputs and outputs take values in {0, 1}, and the channels are discrete memoryless. The input-output
relationship of the channels at each time instant satisfies
Yi = X1,i ·X2,i, Zi = Yi ⊕ Z∗i , (6.4)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and Z∗N is composed of N i.i.d. random variables with distribution Pr{Z∗i = 1} = p and
Pr{Z∗i = 0} = 1− p. Let 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 .
Theorem 12: For the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, the inner bound on
the secrecy capacity region is coincident with the corresponding outer bound. Therefore, the secrecy capacity region
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R(J ) is
R(J ) =
 (R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ h(p)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ h(p)
R1 +R2 ≤ h(p)
 , (6.5)
where h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p).
Proof: See Appendix K.
Fig. 9: The secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders,
and the capacity region of the binary MAC
Figure 9 shows the secrecy capacity region of the binary case of the degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative
encoders, and the capacity region of the binary MAC. It is easy to see that as p→ 12 , the secrecy capacity region
tends to be the capacity region of the binary MAC.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, first, we study the model of degraded MAC with confidential messages. The inner and outer bounds
on the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region are provided for this model. Second, as two
examples, the binary and Gaussian cases of the degraded MAC with confidential messages are studied, and the
inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions are also given for the two examples.
Third, we investigate the MAC-WT with cooperative encoders. The capacity-equivocation regions and the cor-
responding secrecy capacity regions are determined for both the general model and the degraded model. Fourth,
for the model of degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders, we present inner and outer bounds on the
capacity-equivocation region. Finally, we give binary examples for the degraded MAC-WT with cooperative (or
non-cooperative) encoders.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) ∈ RAi, we will show that (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) is achievable. Without loss of gener-
ality, the proof of Theorem 1 is considered into the following four cases.
• (Case 1) If I(X2;Y ) ≥ I(X2;Y1|X1) and R2 ≤ I(X2;Y ), we only need to prove that the tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2)
satisfying Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) and Re2 = I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1), is achievable.
• (Case 2) If I(X2;Y ) ≥ I(X2;Y1|X1) and R2 ≥ I(X2;Y ), we only need to prove that the tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2)
satisfying Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2) − I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y ) − R2 and Re2 = I(X2;Y ) − I(X2;Y1|X1) is
achievable.
• (Case 3) If I(X2;Y ) ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1) and R2 ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1), we only need to prove that the tuple
(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) satisfying Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1) and Re2 = 0
is achievable.
• (Case 4) If I(X2;Y ) ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1) and R2 ≥ I(X2;Y1|X1), we only need to prove that the tuple
(R1, R2, Re1, Re2) satisfying Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)−I(X1;Y2|X2)+I(X2;Y )−R2 and Re2 = 0 is achievable.
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. Some preliminaries about typical sequences are
introduced in Subsection A-A. For the four cases, the construction of the code is introduced in Subsection A-B.
For any given  > 0, the proofs of limN→∞
log‖W1‖
N = R1, limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2, limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1,
limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 and Pe ≤  are given in Subsection A-C.
A. Preliminaries
• Given a probability mass function pV (v), for any η > 0, let TNV (η) be the strong typical set of all v
N such
that |pV (v)− cvN (v)N | < η for all v ∈ V , where cvN (v) is the number of occurences of the letter v in the vN .
We say that the sequences vN ∈ TNV (η) are V -typical.
• Analogously, given a joint probability mass function pVW (v, w), for any η > 0, let TNVW (η) be the joint strong
typical set of all pairs (vN , wN ) such that |pVW (v, w)− cvN ,wN (v,w)N | < η for all v ∈ V and w ∈ W , where
cvN ,wN (v, w) is the number of occurences of (v, w) in the pair of sequences (vN , wN ). We say that the pairs
of sequences (vN , wN ) ∈ TNVW (η) are VW -typical.
• Moreover, wN is called W |V -generated by vN iff vN is V - typical and (vN , wN ) ∈ TNVW (η). For any given
vN ∈ TNV (η), define TNW |V (η) = {wN : wN is W |V -generated by vN}.
• Lemma 1: For any vN ∈ TNV (η),
2−N(H(V )+η
∗) ≤ pV N (vN ) ≤ 2−N(H(V )−η
∗),
where η∗ → 0 as η → 0.
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B. Coding Construction
The code constructions for the four cases are almost the same (by using Wyner’s random binning technique),
except that the total number of xN1 and xN2 are different, see the followings.
• For case 1, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)−
I(X1;Y2|X2) and Re2 = I(X2;Y )−I(X2;Y1|X1). Given a tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2), choose a joint probability
mass function pX1,X2,Y,Y1,Y2(x1, x2, y, y1, y2) such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re1 ≤ R1, Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2),
Re2 ≤ R2, Re2 = I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1).
It is easy to check that the last three inequalities in Theorem 1 hold by using the conditions that Re1 =
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) and Re2 = I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1).
The confidential message sets W1 and W2 satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ‖= R1, lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W2 ‖= R2. (6)
Code-book generation for case 1:
– Generate 2N(I(X1;Y |X2)−N ) codewords xN1 (N →∞ as N →∞), and each of them is uniformly drawn
from the strong typical set TNX1(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X1;Y |X2)−N ) codewords into 2NR1 bins, and each
bin corresponds to a specific value in W1.
– Analogously, generate 2N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords xN2 , and each of them is uniformly drawn from the
strong typical set TNX2(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords into 2NR2 bins, and each bin corresponds
to a specific value in W2.
• For case 2, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)−
I(X1;Y2|X2)+I(X2;Y )−R2 and Re2 = I(X2;Y )−I(X2;Y1|X1). Given a tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2), choose
a joint probability mass function pX1,X2,Y,Y1,Y2(x1, x2, y, y1, y2) such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re1 ≤ R1, Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )−R2,
Re2 ≤ R2, Re2 = I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1).
It is easy to check that the last three inequalities in Theorem 1 hold by using the conditions that Re1 =
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )−R2 and Re2 = I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1).
The confidential message sets W1 and W2 also satisfy (6).
Code-book generation for case 2:
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– Generate 2N(I(X1;Y |X2)+I(X2;Y )−R2−N ) codewords xN1 (N → ∞ as N → ∞), and each of them is
uniformly drawn from the strong typical set TNX1(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X1;Y |X2)+I(X2;Y )−R2−N ) codewords
into 2NR1 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific value in W1.
– Generate 2N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords xN2 , and each of them is uniformly drawn from the strong typical
set TNX2(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords into 2NR2 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific
value in W2.
• For case 3, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)−
I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y ) − I(X2;Y1|X1) and Re2 = 0. Given a tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2), choose a joint
probability mass function pX1,X2,Y,Y1,Y2(x1, x2, y, y1, y2) such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re1 ≤ R1, Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1),
Re2 ≤ R2, Re2 = 0.
It is easy to check that the last three inequalities in Theorem 1 hold by using the conditions that Re1 =
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1) and Re2 = 0.
The confidential message sets W1 and W2 also satisfy (6).
Code-book generation for case 3:
– Generate 2N(I(X1;Y |X2)+I(X2;Y )−I(X2;Y1|X1)−N ) codewords xN1 (N →∞ as N →∞), and each of them
is uniformly drawn from the strong typical set TNX1(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X1;Y |X2)+I(X2;Y )−I(X2;Y1|X1)−N )
codewords into 2NR1 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific value in W1.
– Generate 2N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords xN2 , and each of them is uniformly drawn from the strong typical
set TNX2(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords into 2NR2 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific
value in W2.
• For case 4, the existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)−
I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y ) − R2 and Re2 = 0. Given a tuple (R1, R2, Re1, Re2), choose a joint probability
mass function pX1,X2,Y,Y1,Y2(x1, x2, y, y1, y2) such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re1 ≤ R1, Re1 = I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )−R2,
Re2 ≤ R2, Re2 = 0.
It is easy to check that the last three inequalities in Theorem 1 hold by using the conditions that Re1 =
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) + I(X2;Y )−R2 and Re2 = 0.
The confidential message sets W1 and W2 also satisfy (6).
Code-book generation for case 4:
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– Generate 2N(I(X1;Y |X2)+I(X2;Y )−R2−N ) codewords xN1 (N → ∞ as N → ∞), and each of them is
uniformly drawn from the strong typical set TNX1(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X1;Y |X2)+I(X2;Y )−R2−N ) codewords
into 2NR1 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific value in W1.
– Generate 2N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords xN2 , and each of them is uniformly drawn from the strong typical
set TNX2(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X2;Y )−N ) codewords into 2NR2 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific
value in W2.
• (Decoding scheme for all cases) For a given yN , try to find a pair of sequences (xN1 (wˆ1), xN2 (wˆ2)) such that
(xN1 (wˆ1), x
N
2 (wˆ2), y
N ) ∈ TNX1X2Y (). If there exist sequences with the same indices wˆ1 and wˆ2, put out the
corresponding wˆ1 and wˆ2, else declare a decoding error.
C. Proof of the Achievability
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞
log‖W1‖
N = R1 and limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2 for
the two cases.
From the standard techniques as in [18, Ch. 14], we have Pe ≤  for all cases.
It remains to show that limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 and limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 for the four cases, see the followings.
• (Proof of limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 and limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 for case 1)
First, we compute the following equivocation rate of W1.
lim
N→∞
∆1 , lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 , XN2 )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1, Y
N
2 , X
N
2 )−H(Y N2 , XN2 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1, Y
N
2 , X
N
1 , X
N
2 )−H(XN1 |W1, Y N2 , XN2 )−H(Y N2 , XN2 ))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N2 |XN1 , XN2 ) +H(W1, XN1 ) +H(XN2 )−H(XN1 |W1, Y N2 , XN2 )
−H(Y N2 , XN2 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N2 |XN1 , XN2 ) +H(XN1 |W1) +H(W1)−H(XN1 |W1, Y N2 , XN2 )
−H(Y N2 |XN2 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(XN1 |W1) +H(W1)−H(XN1 |W1, Y N2 , XN2 )− I(Y N2 ;XN1 |XN2 ), (7)
where (a) is from W1 → (XN1 , XN2 )→ Y N2 and the fact that XN2 is independent of W1 and XN1 .
The first term in (7) can be bounded as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN1 |W1) ≥ I(X1;Y |X2)−R1, (8)
where (8) is from the property of the strong typical sequences.
The second term in (7) is as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1) = R1. (9)
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For the third term in (7), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN1 |W1, Y N2 , XN2 ) = 0. (10)
This is because for a given w1, there are 2N(I(X1;Y |X2)−N−R1) codewords left for xN1 . Then note that
I(X1;Y |X2)− N −R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− N −Re1
= I(X1;Y |X2)− N − (I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2))
= I(X1;Y2|X2)− N ,
and N → 0 as N →∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (10).
For the fourth term in (7), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(Y N2 ;X
N
1 |XN2 ) ≤ I(X1;Y2|X2), (11)
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (8), (9), (10) and (11) into (7), we have
lim
N→∞
∆1 ≥ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2) = Re1. (12)
limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 is proved. Analogously, we can prove that limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2, see the following.
lim
N→∞
∆2 , lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2|Y N1 , XN1 )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W2, Y
N
1 , X
N
1 )−H(Y N1 , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W2, Y
N
1 , X
N
2 , X
N
1 )−H(XN2 |W2, Y N1 , XN1 )−H(Y N1 , XN1 ))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N1 |XN2 , XN1 ) +H(W2, XN2 ) +H(XN1 )−H(XN2 |W2, Y N1 , XN1 )
−H(Y N1 , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N1 |XN2 , XN1 ) +H(XN2 |W2) +H(W2)−H(XN2 |W2, Y N1 , XN1 )
−H(Y N1 |XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(XN2 |W2) +H(W2)−H(XN2 |W2, Y N1 , XN1 )− I(Y N1 ;XN2 |XN1 ), (13)
where (a) is from W2 → (XN1 , XN2 )→ Y N1 and the fact that XN1 is independent of W2 and XN2 .
The first term in (13) can be bounded as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN2 |W2) ≥ I(X2;Y )−R2, (14)
where (14) is from the property of the strong typical sequences.
The second term in (13) is as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2) = R2. (15)
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For the third term in (13), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN2 |W2, Y N1 , XN1 ) = 0. (16)
This is because for a given w2, there are 2N(I(X2;Y )−N−R2) codewords left for xN2 . Then note that
I(X2;Y )− N −R2 ≤ I(X2;Y )− N −Re2
= I(X2;Y )− N − (I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1))
= I(X2;Y1|X1)− N ,
and N → 0 as N →∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (16).
For the fourth term in (13), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(Y N1 ;X
N
2 |XN1 ) ≤ I(X2;Y1|X1), (17)
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (14), (15), (16) and (17) into (13), we have
lim
N→∞
∆2 ≥ I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Y1|X1) = Re2. (18)
limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 is proved. Therefore, the proof for case 1 is completed.
• (Proof of limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 and limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2 for case 2, case 3 and case 4) Note that (7) and
(13) also hold for case 2, case 3 and case 4, and the proofs of limN→∞∆1 ≥ Re1 and limN→∞∆2 ≥ Re2
are similar to that of case 1. Therefore, we omit the proof here. The proof for case 2, case 3 and case 4 is
completed.
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2: all the achievable (R1, R2, Re1, Re2) tuples are contained in the set R(Ao),
i.e., for any achievable tuple, there exist random variables X1, X2, Y , Y1 and Y2 such that the inequalities in
Theorem 2 hold, and (X1, X2)→ Y → (Y1, Y2) forms a Markov chain. We will prove the inequalities of Theorem
2 in the remainder of this section.
(Proof of 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)) The proof of this inequality is as follows.
1
N
H(W1)
(a)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1;Y
N ) + δ(Pe))
(b)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 ;Y
N ) + δ(Pe))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 ;Y
N |XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
(d)
≤ 1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i) + δ(Pe))
(e)
= I(X1;Y |X2) + δ(Pe)
N
, (1)
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where (a) is from the Fano’s inequality, (b) is from the data processing theorem, (c) is from the fact that XN1 and
XN2 are independent, (d) is from the discrete memoryless property of the channel, and (e) is from the definitions that
X1 , (X1,J , J), X2 , (X2,J , J), Y , YJ , where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}),
and it is independent of X1,i, X2,i and Yi.
By using Pe ≤ , R1 = limN→∞ H(W1)N and (1), it is easy to see that 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2).
(Proof of 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)) The proof is similar to the proof of 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), and it is omitted
here.
(Proof of 0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ))
1
N
H(W1,W2)
(1)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N ) + δ(Pe))
(2)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Y
N ) + δ(Pe))
(3)
≤ 1
N
(
N∑
i=1
I(X1,i, X2,i;Yi) + δ(Pe))
(4)
= I(X1, X2;Y ) +
δ(Pe)
N
, (2)
where (1) is from the Fano’s inequality, (2) is from the data processing theorem, (3) is from the discrete memoryless
property of the channel, and (4) is from the definitions that X1 , (X1,J , J), X2 , (X2,J , J), Y , YJ .
By using Pe ≤ , R1 = limN→∞ H(W1)N , R2 = limN→∞ H(W2)N and (2), it is easy to see that 0 ≤ R1 + R2 ≤
I(X1, X2;Y ).
(Proof of 0 ≤ Re1 ≤ R1 and 0 ≤ Re2 ≤ R2) The two inequalities are obtained by the following equations.
Re1 ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 , XN2 ) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1) = R1. (3)
Re2 ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2|Y N1 , XN1 ) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2) = R2. (4)
(Proof of Re1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2)) The proof is obtained by the following (5), (6), and Pe ≤ .
Re1 ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1|Y N2 , XN2 )
(a)
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|Y N2 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe)−H(W1|Y N2 , XN2 , Y N ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |Y N2 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N |Y N2 , XN2 )−H(Y N |Y N2 , XN2 ,W1, XN1 ) + δ(Pe))
(b)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N |Y N2 , XN2 )−H(Y N |Y N2 , XN2 , XN1 ) + δ(Pe))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(Y N ;XN1 |Y N2 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe)), (5)
where (a) is from the Fano’s inequality, and (b) is from W1 → (Y N2 , XN2 , XN1 )→ Y N .
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I(Y N ;XN1 |Y N2 , XN2 ) = H(XN1 |Y N2 , XN2 )−H(XN1 |Y N2 , XN2 , Y N )
(c)
= H(XN1 |Y N2 , XN2 )−H(XN1 |XN2 , Y N )
= H(XN1 |Y N2 , XN2 )−H(XN1 |XN2 , Y N )−H(XN1 |XN2 ) +H(XN1 |XN2 )
= I(XN1 ;Y
N |XN2 )− I(XN1 ;Y N2 |XN2 )
= H(Y N |XN2 )−H(Y N |XN1 , XN2 )−H(Y N2 |XN2 ) +H(Y N2 |XN1 , XN2 )
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 )−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)−H(Y2,i|Y i−12 , XN2 ) +H(Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i))
≤
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 )−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)−H(Y2,i|Y i−12 , XN2 , Y i−1) +H(Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i))
(d)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, XN2 )−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)−H(Y2,i|XN2 , Y i−1) +H(Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i))
(e)
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Ui, X2,i)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)−H(Y2,i|Ui, X2,i) +H(Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i))
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Ui, X2,i)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)−H(Yi|X2,i) +H(Yi|X2,i)
−H(Y2,i|Ui, X2,i) +H(Y2,i|X1,i, X2,i) +H(Y2,i|X2,i)−H(Y2,i|X2,i))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i)− I(Ui;Yi|X2,i) + I(Ui;Y2,i|X2,i)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i) +H(Ui|X2,i, Yi)−H(Ui|X2,i, Y2,i))
(f)
=
N∑
i=1
(I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i) +H(Ui|X2,i, Yi, Y2,i)−H(Ui|X2,i, Y2,i))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i)− I(Ui;Yi|X2,i, Y2,i))
≤
N∑
i=1
(I(X1,i;Yi|X2,i)− I(X1,i;Y2,i|X2,i))
(g)
= I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Y2|X2), (6)
where (c) is from Y N2 → (XN2 , Y N ) → XN1 , (d) is from Y i−12 → (XN2 , Y i−1) → Y2,i, (e) is from the definition
Ui , (Y i−1, XN2,i+1, Xi−12 ), (f) is from Ui → (X2,i, Yi)→ Y2,i, and (g) is from the definitions that X1 , (X1,J , J),
X2 , (X2,J , J), Y , YJ , Y2 , Y2,J where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and
it is independent of X1,i, X2,i, Yi and Y2,i.
(Proof of Re2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1) − I(X2;Y1|X1)) The proof is analogous to the proof of Re1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2) −
I(X1;Y2|X2).
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The Markov chain (X1, X2) → Y → (Y1, Y2) is directly obtained from the definitions X1 , (X1,J , J), X2 ,
(X2,J , J), Y , YJ , Y2 , Y2,J and Y1 , Y1,J .
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3 AND THEOREM 4
A. Proof of Theorem 3
The achievability proof follows by computing the mutual information terms in Theorem 1 with the following
joint distributions:
X
′
1 ∼ N (0, αP1) and X
′
2 ∼ N (0, βP2).
X1 =
√
(1− α)P1
P2
X2 +X
′
1 and X2 =
√
(1− β)P2
P1
X1 +X
′
2.
X
′
1 is independent of X
′
2.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
The proof of Re1 ≤ 12 log(1 + αP1N0 )− 12 log(1 + αP1N0+N2 ) and Re2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
βP2
N0
)− 12 log(1 + βP2N0+N1 ) can be
directly obtained from [13, p. 1000-1001] by letting R0 = 0 and Q be a constant. Other inequalities in Theorem 3
are from the capacity region of the Gaussian MAC, and they are easily obtained from [13, p. 999-1000]. Therefore,
the full details are omitted here.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5 AND THEOREM 6
The proof of Theorem 5 is along the lines of Appendix A. The proof of Theorem 6 is obtained by computing
the mutual information terms in Theorem 2, see the followings.
All the random variables take values in {0, 1}. Let Pr{X1 = 0} = α, Pr{X1 = 1} = 1−α, Pr{X2 = 0} = β
and Pr{X2 = 1} = 1− β. Note that X1, X2, Y , Y1 and Y2 satisfy
Y = X1 ·X2, Y1 = Y ⊕ Z1, Y2 = Y ⊕ Z2, (7)
where X1 is independent of X2, and Pr{Z1 = 0} = 1 − p, Pr{Z1 = 1} = p, Pr{Z2 = 0} = 1 − q, Pr{Z2 =
1} = q.
The joint probability pX1X2Y is calculated by (8).
pX1,X2,Y (x1, x2, y) = pY |X1,X2(y|x1, x2)pX1(x1)pX2(x2). (8)
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The joint probability pX1X2Y1 is calculated by (9).
pX1,X2,Y1(x1, x2, y1) =
∑
y
pY1|Y (y1|y)pY |X1,X2(y|x1, x2)pX1(x1)pX2(x2). (9)
The joint probability pX1X2Y2 is calculated by (10).
pX1,X2,Y2(x1, x2, y2) =
∑
y
pY2|Y (y2|y)pY |X1,X2(y|x1, x2)pX1(x1)pX2(x2). (10)
Then, the mutual information term I(X1;Y |X2) is
I(X1;Y |X2) = (1− β)h(α) ≤ h(α) ≤ 1, (11)
where h(α) = −α log(α)−(1−α) log(1−α). Similarly, I(X2;Y |X1) ≤ h(β) ≤ 1, I(X1, X2;Y ) = h(α+β−αβ) ≤
1, I(X2;Y |X1) − I(X2;Y1|X1) ≤ h(β) + h(p) − h(β + p − 2βp) ≤ h(p) and I(X1;Y |X2) − I(X1;Y2|X2) ≤
h(α) + h(q)− h(α+ q − 2αp) ≤ h(q).
Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are obtained.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THE CONVERSE PART OF THEOREM 7
In this section, we establish the converse part of Theorem 7: all the achievable (R1, R2, Re) triples are contained
in the set R(D). We will prove the inequalities in Theorem 7 in the remaining of this section.
(Proof of 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2)) The proof of this inequality is as follows.
1
N
H(W1)
(a)
≤ 1
N
(H(W1|W2) + δ(Pe)−H(W1|W2, Y N ))
=
1
N
(I(W1;Y
N |W2) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1,W2)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W2,W1)) + δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1,W2)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W2,W1, ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(b)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|U2,i)−H(Yi|U2,i, Vi)) + δ(Pe)
N
(c)
= I(V ;Y |U2) + δ(Pe)
N
, (12)
where (a) is from the Fano’s inequality and the fact that W1 is independent of W2, (b) is from the definitions U2,i ,
(Y i−1,W2) and Vi , (Y i−1,W2,W1, ZNi+1), and (c) is from the definitions that U2 , (U2,J , J), V , (VJ , J),
Y , YJ , where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of U2,i, Vi
and Yi.
By using Pe ≤ , R1 = limN→∞ H(W1)N and (12), it is easy to see that 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2).
(Proof of 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1)) The proof is similar to the proof of 0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2), and it is omitted
here. Note that U1 , (Y J−1,W1, J).
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(Proof of 0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y ))
1
N
H(W1,W2)
(1)
≤ 1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W1,W2)) + δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W1,W2, ZNi+1)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(2)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|Vi)) + δ(Pe)
N
(3)
= I(V ;Y ) +
δ(Pe)
N
, (13)
where (1) is from the Fano’s inequality, (2) is from the definition Vi , (Y i−1,W2,W1, ZNi+1), and (3) is from the
definitions that V , (VJ , J), Y , YJ , where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and
it is independent of Vi and Yi.
By using Pe ≤ , R1 = limN→∞ H(W1)N , R2 = limN→∞ H(W2)N and (13), it is easy to see that 0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤
I(V ;Y ).
(Proof of 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1 +R2) This inequality is obtained by the following (14).
Re ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|Y N ) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2) = R1 +R2. (14)
(Proof of Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U)) The proof is obtained by substituting (16), (17), (18) and (21) into
(15), and using Pe ≤  and the definitions U , (Y J−1;ZNJ+1, J) and V , (W1,W2, Y J−1;ZNJ+1, J).
Re ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2)− I(W1,W2;ZN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N ) +H(W1,W2|Y N )− I(W1,W2;ZN ))
(a)
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N )− I(W1,W2;ZN ) + δ(Pe)), (15)
where (a) is from the Fano’s inequality.
I(W1,W2;Y
N ) =
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W1,W2))
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1,W1,W2)−H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1) +H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−H(Yi|Y i−1,W1,W2, ZNi+1) +H(Yi|Y i−1,W1,W2, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1)− I(Yi;ZNi+1|Y i−1,W1,W2) + I(Yi;W1,W2|Y i−1, ZNi+1)). (16)
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I(W1,W2;Z
N ) =
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|ZNi+1)−H(Zi|ZNi+1,W1,W2))
=
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|ZNi+1)−H(Zi|ZNi+1,W1,W2)−H(Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1) +H(Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1)
−H(Zi|Y i−1,W1,W2, ZNi+1) +H(Zi|Y i−1,W1,W2, ZNi+1))
=
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1)− I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1,W1,W2) + I(Zi;W1,W2|Y i−1, ZNi+1)). (17)
Note that
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1). (18)
Proof of (18): The right hand side of (18) is equal to
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, ZNj+1), (19)
and the left hand side of (18) is equal to
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1) =
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
I(Zi;Yj |ZNi+1, Y j−1)
=
N∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
I(Zj ;Yi|ZNj+1, Y i−1)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
I(Zj ;Yi|ZNj+1, Y i−1), (20)
and therefore, the formula (18) is verified by (19) and (20).
Analogously,
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1,W1,W2) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1,W1,W2). (21)
The Markov chain (U,U1, U2)→ V → (X1, X2)→ (Y, Z) is directly obtained from the above definitions.
The proof of the converse part of Theorem 7 is completed.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THE DIRECT PART OF THEOREM 7
In this section we establish the direct part of Theorem 7(about existence). Suppose (R1, R2, Re) ∈ RD, we will
show that (R1, R2, Re) is achievable.
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient condition Re = I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U). Given
a triple (R1, R2, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pU,U1,U2,V,X1,X2,Y,Z(u, u1, u2, v, x1, x2, y, z) such
that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y ),
Re ≤ R1 +R2, Re = I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).
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The message sets W1 and W2 satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ‖= R1, (22)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W2 ‖= R2. (23)
Note that
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ×W2 ‖= R1 +R2 ≥ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U). (24)
Now the remaining of this section is organized as follows. The encoding-decoding scheme is introduced in
Subsection F-A. For any given  > 0, the proofs of limN→∞
log‖W1‖
N = R1, limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2, limN→∞∆ ≥
Re and Pe ≤  are given in Subsection F-B.
Fig. 10: Code construction for MAC-WT with cooperative encoders
A. Encoding-decoding Scheme
The encoding scheme for the MAC-WT with cooperative encoders is in Figure 10. In the reminder of this
subsection, we will introduce the realization of the random vectors in Figure 10.
• (A realization of UN1 and UN2 ) For each w1 (w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}), generate a corresponding codeword
uN1 (w1) i.i.d. according to the probability mass function pU1(u1). Similarly, for each w2 (w1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR2}),
generate a corresponding codeword uN2 (w2) i.i.d. according to the probability mass function pU2(u2). u
N
1 (w1)
and uN2 (w2) are realizations of the random vectors U
N
1 and U
N
2 , respectively.
• (A realization of UN ) Let uN (m) (1 ≤ m ≤ 2Nγ) be chosen from the strong typical set TNU (η∗), where
η∗ is an arbitrary small positive real number and 0 ≤ γ ≤ min{I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)}. Moreover, let Φ be a set
defined as Φ = {uN (m) : 1 ≤ m ≤ 2Nγ}. Note that the elements of Φ are distinguishable. Choose a sequence
uN (m) from the set Φ as a realization of UN , and label the sequence uN (m) as m.
• (Step ii) (A realization of V N )
Let J , L and M be the random variables used for indexing the random vector V N , and the three random
variables take values in the index sets J , L and M, respectively. Let vNjlm be a realization of the random
vector V N , where j, l, m run over the index sets J , L and M. The construction of the sequence vNjlm is
considered in three parts. The first part is about the determination of the size of the indices j, l and m appeared
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in the sequence vNjlm. The second part is the full details of how to choose the indices of the sequence v
N
jlm.
The third part is the construction of the sequence vNjlm, see the following.
– (The size of J , L and M)
The indices j, l and m appeared in the sequence vNjlm respectively run over the index sets J , L, M with
the following properties:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ J ‖= I(V ;Z|U), (25)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ L ‖= I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (26)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ M ‖= γ, (27)
where γ satisfies 0 ≤ γ ≤ min{I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)}.
– (The chosen of j, l and m)
∗ (Case 1) If R1 + R2 ≥ I(V ;Y |U), let W1 ×W2 = J × L ×M. Therefore, in this case, the chosen
of uN (m) is based on w1 and w2.
The indices j, l and m are chosen based on w1 and w2.
∗ (Case 2) If R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U), let W1 ×W2 = L×K, where K is an arbitrary set such that (24)
holds. Let g¯ be a mapping of J into K, partitioning J into subsets of nearly equal size. Note that in
this case, the chosen of uN (m) is not based on w1 and w2.
The index j is randomly chosen from the set g¯−1(k) ⊂ J (where g¯−1 is the inverse mapping of g¯,
and k ∈ K).
The index m is chosen according to the label of uN (m).
The index l is chosen from L.
– (The construction of vNjlm) The construction of vNjlm is as follows. For each m ∈ M, there exists a
U -typical sequence uN (m) ∈ Φ such that all the vNjlm are V |U -generated by uN (m), and this indicates
that vNjlm ∈ TNV (η∗∗), where η∗∗ is an arbitrary small positive real number.
• (A realization of XN1 and XN2 ) xN1 is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC)
with input vNjlm and output x
N
1 . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX1|V (x1|v).
Similarly, xN2 is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with input v
N
jlm and output
xN2 . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX2|V (x2|v).
• (Decoding scheme of the legitimate receiver) For given yN , try to find a sequence vN
jˆlˆmˆ
such that (vN
jˆlˆmˆ
, yN ) ∈
TNV Y (
∗∗∗). If there exist sequences with the same indices jˆ, lˆ and mˆ, put out the corresponding wˆ1 and wˆ2,
else declare a decoding error.
B. Achievability Proof
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞
log‖W1‖
N = R1 and limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2.
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Then, observing the construction of V N , it is easy to see that the codewords of V N are upper-bounded by
2NI(V ;Y ). Therefore, from the standard channel coding theorem, for any given  > 0 and sufficiently large N , we
have Pe ≤ .
It remains to show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following. Let M be the random variable defined as the third
coordinate of the actual value of V N . Then
lim
N→∞
∆ , lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ,M)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2, Z
N |M)−H(ZN |M))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2, V
N , ZN |M)−H(V N |W1,W2, ZN ,M)−H(ZN |M))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2, V
N |M) +H(ZN |V N )−H(V N |W1,W2, ZN ,M)−H(ZN |M))
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(V N |M) +H(ZN |V N )−H(V N |W1,W2, ZN ,M)−H(ZN |M)), (28)
where (a) is from the Markov chain (W1,W2,M)→ V N → ZN .
The first term in (28) can be bounded as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(V N |M) ≥ I(V ;Y |U), (29)
where (29) is from the property of the strong typical sequences and the construction of V N , see [2, p. 343].
The second term in (28) is as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(ZN |V N ) ≥ H(Z|V ), (30)
where (30) is from a similar proof in [2, p. 343].
For the third term in (28), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(V N |W1,W2, ZN ,M) = 0. (31)
This is because for given m, w1 and w2, there are at most 2NI(V ;Z|U) codewords left for vN . Then note that
I(V ;Z|U) = H(Z|U)−H(Z|V )
≤ I(V ;Z).
From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (31).
For the fourth term in (28), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(ZN |M) ≤ H(Z|U), (32)
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (29), (30), (31) and (32) into (28), we have
lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U). (33)
Therefore, the achievability proof for Theorem 7 is completed.
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APPENDIX G
SIZE CONSTRAINTS OF THE AUXILIARY RANDOM VARIABLES IN THEOREM 7
By using the support lemma (see [17], p.310), it suffices to show that the random variables U1, U2, U and V
can be replaced by new ones, preserving the Markovity (U,U1, U2) → V → (X1, X2) → (Y, Z) and the mutual
information I(V ;Y |U1), I(V ;Y |U2), I(V ;Y ), I(V ;Y |U), I(V ;Z|U), and furthermore, the ranges of the new U1,
U2, U and V satisfy:
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1,
‖U1‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖,
‖U2‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖,
‖V‖ ≤ (‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1)2‖X1‖2‖X2‖2.
The proof is in the reminder of this section.
Let
p¯ = pX1X2(x1, x2). (34)
Define the following continuous scalar functions of p¯ :
fX1X2(p¯) = pX1X2(x1, x2), fY (p¯) = H(Y ), fZ(p¯) = H(Z).
Since there are ‖X1‖‖X2‖ − 1 functions of fX1X2(p¯), the total number of the continuous scalar functions of p¯ is
‖X1‖‖X2‖+1.
Let p¯X1X2|U = Pr{X1 = x1, X2 = x2|U = u}. With these distributions p¯X1X2|U , we have
pX1X2(x1, x2) =
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fX1X2(p¯X1X2|U ), (35)
H(Y |U) =
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fY (p¯X1X2|U ), (36)
H(Z|U) =
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fZ(p¯X1X2|U ). (37)
According to the support lemma ([17], p.310), the random variable U can be replaced by new ones such that the
new U takes at most ‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1 different values and the expressions (35), (36) and (37) are preserved.
Similarly, we can prove that ‖U1‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖ and ‖U2‖ ≤ ‖X1‖‖X2‖.
Once the alphabets of U , U1, U2 are fixed, we apply similar arguments to bound the alphabet of V , see the
following. Define ‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1 continuous scalar functions of p¯X1X2 :
fX1X2(p¯X1X2) = pX1X2(x1, x2), fY (p¯X1X2) = H(Y ), fZ(p¯X1X2) = H(Z),
where of the functions fX1X2(p¯X1X2), only ‖X1‖‖X2‖ − 1 are to be considered.
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For fixed u, u1 and u2, let p¯X1X2|V = Pr{X1 = x1, X2 = x2|V = v}. With these distributions p¯X1X2|V , we
have
Pr{X1 = x1, X2 = x2|U = u, U1 = u1, U2 = u2} =
∑
v∈V
Pr{V = v|U = u, U1 = u1, U2 = u2}fX1X2(p¯X1X2|V ),
(38)
H(Y |V ) =
∑
v∈V
fY (p¯X1X2|V )Pr{V = v|U = u, U1 = u1, U2 = u2}, (39)
H(Z|V ) =
∑
v∈V
fZ(p¯X1X2|V )Pr{V = v|U = u, U1 = u1, U2 = u2}. (40)
By the support lemma ([17], p.310), for fixed u, u1 and u2, the size of the alphabet of the random variable V
can not be larger than ‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1, and therefore, ‖V‖ ≤ (‖X1‖‖X2‖+ 1)2‖X1‖2‖X2‖2 is proved.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
The only difference between Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 is the upper bound of Re. Since the degraded MAC-WT
with cooperative encoders is a special case of the general model, and therefore, the converse proof of Theorem 8
can be directly obtained from the converse proof of Theorem 7 and (4.3). Now it remains to prove the achievability,
see the remainder of this section.
The encoding-decoding scheme for Theorem 8 is a special case of that for Theorem 7, see Figure 11.
Fig. 11: Code construction for degraded MAC-WT with cooperative encoders
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient condition Re = I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z). Given a triple
(R1, R2, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pU1,U2,V,X1,X2,Y,Z(u1, u2, v, x1, x2, y, z) such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U2), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y ),
Re ≤ R1 +R2, Re = I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z).
The message sets W1 and W2 satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ‖= R1, (41)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W2 ‖= R2. (42)
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Note that
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ×W2 ‖= R1 +R2 ≥ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z). (43)
The construction of UN1 and U
N
2 in Figure 11 is the same as those in Appendix G, and V
N is constructed as
follows.
Generate 2N(I(V ;Y )−N ) codewords vN (N →∞ as N →∞), and each of them is uniformly drawn from the
strong typical set TNV (η). Divide the 2
N(I(V ;Y )−N ) codewords into 2N(R1+R2) bins, and each bin corresponds to
a specific value in W1 ×W2.
(A realization of XN1 and XN2 ) xN1 is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with
input vNjlm and output x
N
1 . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX1|V (x1|v).
Similarly, xN2 is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with input v
N
jlm and output
xN2 . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX2|V (x2|v).
(Decoding scheme of the legitimate receiver) For given yN , try to find a sequence vN (wˆ1, wˆ2) such that
(vN (wˆ1, wˆ2), y
N ) ∈ TNV Y (∗∗∗). If there exist sequences with the same wˆ1 and wˆ2, put out the corresponding wˆ1
and wˆ2, else declare a decoding error.
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞
log‖W1‖
N = R1 and limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2.
Then, observing the construction of V N , it is easy to see that the codewords of V N are upper-bounded by
2NI(V ;Y ). Therefore, from the standard channel coding theorem, for any given  > 0 and sufficiently large N , we
have Pe ≤ .
It remains to show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
lim
N→∞
∆ , lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2, Z
N )−H(ZN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2, V
N , ZN )−H(V N |W1,W2, ZN )−H(ZN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(V N |W1,W2) +H(W1,W2)−H(V N |W1,W2, ZN )− I(V N ;ZN )). (44)
The first term in (44) is
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(V N |W1,W2) = I(V ;Y )−R1 −R2. (45)
The second term in (44) is as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2) = R1 +R2. (46)
For the third term in (44), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(V N |W1,W2, ZN ) = 0. (47)
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This is because for given w1 and w2, there are 2N(I(V ;Y )−N−R1−R2) codewords left for vN . Then note that
I(V ;Y )− N −R2 −R1 ≤ I(V ;Y )− N −Re
= I(V ;Y )− N − (I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z))
= I(V ;Z)− N ,
and N → 0 as N →∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (47).
For the fourth term in (44), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(V N ;ZN ) ≤ I(V ;Z), (48)
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (45), (46), (47) and (48) into (44), we have
lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z) = Re. (49)
limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved. Therefore, the achievability proof for Theorem 8 is completed.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
Suppose (R1, R2, Re) ∈ RG , we will show that (R1, R2, Re) is achievable. Since RG = L(1)∪L(2)∪L(3)∪L(4),
we need to prove that (R1, R2, Re) ∈ L(i) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is achievable.
Note that L(1) is analogous to L(2), and L(3) is analogous to L(4). Thus, in the remainder of this section, we
only prove that (R1, R2, Re) ∈ L(1) and (R1, R2, Re) ∈ L(3) are achievable.
A. Achievability of L(1)
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that Re = I(X2;Y |X1)−I(X2;Z|X1)+
R1. Given a triple (R1, R2, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pX1,X2,Y,Z(x1, x2, y, z) such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z), 0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1), R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re ≤ R1 +R2, Re = I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1) +R1.
Note that Re = I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1) +R1 implies that
R2 ≥ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1). (50)
Define
R1 = I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z)− γ, (51)
where γ ≥ 0.
The confidential message sets W1 and W2 satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ‖= R1, lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W2 ‖= R2. (52)
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Code-book generation: Generate 2N(I(X1;Y )−γ−N ) codewords xN1 (N → ∞ as N → ∞), and each of them
is uniformly drawn from the strong typical set TNX1(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X1;Y )−γ−N ) codewords into 2NR1 bins,
and each bin corresponds to a specific value in W1.
Analogously, generate 2N(I(X2;Y |X1)−N ) codewords xN2 , and each of them is uniformly drawn from the strong
typical set TNX2(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X2;Y |X1)−N ) codewords into 2NR2 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific
value in W2.
Decoding scheme: For a given yN , try to find a pair of sequences (xN1 (wˆ1), xN2 (wˆ2)) such that (xN1 (wˆ1), xN2 (wˆ2), yN ) ∈
TNX1X2Y (). If there exist sequences with the same indices wˆ1 and wˆ2, put out the corresponding wˆ1 and wˆ2, else
declare a decoding error.
Proof of the achievability: By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞ log‖W1‖N = R1 and
limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2.
Then, note that the codewords of xN1 and x
N
2 are respectively upper bounded by 2
NI(X1;Y ) and 2NI(X2;Y |X1).
Therefore, from the standard techniques as in [18, Ch. 14], we have Pe ≤ .
It remains to show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
lim
N→∞
∆ , lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|ZN ,W1))
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|ZN ,W1, XN1 ))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|ZN , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N )−H(ZN ) +H(W2, ZN , XN1 )−H(ZN , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XN1 )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN )−H(ZN )
+H(W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
2 )−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 )−H(ZN , XN1 ))
(b)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 ) +H(W1) +H(XN1 |W1)−H(XN1 |W1, ZN )−H(ZN )
+H(ZN |XN1 , XN2 ) +H(XN1 ) +H(W2) +H(XN2 |W2)−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 )−H(ZN , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1) +H(X
N
1 |W1)−H(XN1 |W1, ZN ) +H(XN2 |W2) +H(W2)
−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 )− I(XN1 , XN2 ;ZN )), (53)
where (a) is from W1 → (XN1 , ZN )→W2, and (b) is from W1 → XN1 → ZN and W2 → (XN1 , XN2 )→ ZN .
The first term in (53) is
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1) = R1. (54)
The second term in (53) can be bounded as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN1 |W1) = I(X1;Y )− γ −R1. (55)
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For the third term in (53), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN1 |W1, ZN ) = 0. (56)
This is because for a given w1, there are 2N(I(X1;Y )−γ−N−R1) codewords left for xN1 . Then note that
I(X1;Y )− γ − N −R1 = I(X1;Y )− γ − N − (I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z)− γ)
= I(X1;Z)− N ,
and N → 0 as N →∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (56).
For the fourth term in (53), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN2 |W2) = I(X2;Y |X1)−R2. (57)
The fifth term in (53) is
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2) = R2. (58)
For the sixth term in (53), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 ) = 0. (59)
This is because for given w2 and xN1 , there are 2
N(I(X2;Y |X1)−N−R2) codewords left for xN2 . Then note that
I(X2;Y |X1)− N −R2
(1)
≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− N − (I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1))
= I(X2;Z|X1)− N ,
where (1) is from (50), and N → 0 as N → ∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s
inequality, we have (59).
For the seventh term in (53), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Z
N ) ≤ I(X1, X2;Z), (60)
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (54), (55), (56), (57), (58), (59) and (60) into (53), we have
lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ I(X1;Y )− γ + I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X1, X2;Z)
= I(X1;Y )− γ + I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X1;Z)− I(X2;Z|X1)
(a)
= I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1) +R1 = Re, (61)
where (a) is from (51).
Thus, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved.
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B. Achievability of L(3)
The existence of the encoder-decoder is under the sufficient conditions that Re = I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z).
Given a triple (R1, R2, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pX1,X2,Y,Z(x1, x2, y, z) such that
I(X1;Y )−I(X1;Z) ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y ), I(X2;Y |X1)−I(X2;Z|X1) ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1), R1+R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
Re ≤ R1 +R2, Re = I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z).
The confidential message sets W1 and W2 satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W1 ‖= R1, lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ W2 ‖= R2. (62)
Code-book generation: Generate 2N(I(X1;Y )−N ) codewords xN1 (N → ∞ as N → ∞), and each of them is
uniformly drawn from the strong typical set TNX1(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X1;Y )−N ) codewords into 2NR1 bins, and
each bin corresponds to a specific value in W1.
Analogously, generate 2N(I(X2;Y |X1)−N ) codewords xN2 , and each of them is uniformly drawn from the strong
typical set TNX2(η). Divide the 2
N(I(X2;Y |X1)−N ) codewords into 2NR2 bins, and each bin corresponds to a specific
value in W2.
Decoding scheme: For a given yN , try to find a pair of sequences (xN1 (wˆ1), xN2 (wˆ2)) such that (xN1 (wˆ1), xN2 (wˆ2), yN ) ∈
TNX1X2Y (). If there exist sequences with the same indices wˆ1 and wˆ2, put out the corresponding wˆ1 and wˆ2, else
declare a decoding error.
Proof of the achievability: By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞ log‖W1‖N = R1 and
limN→∞
log‖W2‖
N = R2.
Then, note that the codewords of xN1 and x
N
2 are respectively upper bounded by 2
NI(X1;Y |X2) and 2NI(X2;Y |X1).
Therefore, from the standard techniques as in [18, Ch. 14], we have Pe ≤ .
It remains to show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
lim
N→∞
∆ , lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|ZN ,W1))
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|ZN ,W1, XN1 ))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1|ZN ) +H(W2|ZN , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N )−H(ZN ) +H(W2, ZN , XN1 )−H(ZN , XN1 ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1, Z
N , XN1 )−H(XN1 |W1, ZN )−H(ZN )
+H(W2, Z
N , XN1 , X
N
2 )−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 )−H(ZN , XN1 ))
(b)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(ZN |XN1 ) +H(W1) +H(XN1 |W1)−H(XN1 |W1, ZN )−H(ZN )
+H(ZN |XN1 , XN2 ) +H(XN1 ) +H(W2) +H(XN2 |W2)−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 )−H(ZN , XN1 ))
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= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1) +H(X
N
1 |W1)−H(XN1 |W1, ZN ) +H(XN2 |W2) +H(W2)
−H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 )− I(XN1 , XN2 ;ZN )), (63)
where (a) is from W1 → (XN1 , ZN )→W2, and (b) is from W1 → XN1 → ZN and W2 → (XN1 , XN2 )→ ZN .
The first term in (63) is
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1) = R1. (64)
The second term in (63) can be bounded as follows.
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN1 |W1) = I(X1;Y )−R1. (65)
For the third term in (63), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN1 |W1, ZN ) = 0. (66)
This is because for a given w1, there are 2N(I(X1;Y )−N−R1) codewords left for xN1 . Then note that
I(X1;Y )− N −R1 ≤ I(X1;Y )− N − (I(X1;Y )− I(X1;Z))
= I(X1;Z)− N ,
and N → 0 as N →∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (66).
For the fourth term in (63), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN2 |W2) = I(X2;Y |X1)−R2. (67)
The fifth term in (63) is
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W2) = R2. (68)
For the sixth term in (63), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
H(XN2 |W2, ZN , XN1 ) = 0. (69)
This is because for given w2 and xN1 , there are 2
N(I(X2;Y |X1)−N−R2) codewords left for xN2 . Then note that
I(X2;Y |X1)− N −R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− N − (I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z|X1))
= I(X2;Z|X1)− N ,
and N → 0 as N →∞. From the standard channel coding theorem and the Fano’s inequality, we have (69).
For the seventh term in (63), we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(XN1 , X
N
2 ;Z
N ) ≤ I(X1, X2;Z), (70)
and this is from a standard technique as in [2, p. 343].
Substituting (64), (65), (66), (67), (68), (69) and (70) into (63), we have
lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ I(X1;Y ) + I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X1, X2;Z)
= I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z) = Re. (71)
Thus, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved.
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APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 10
In this section, we prove Theorem 10. The first three bounds in Theorem 10 are the capacity region the MAC,
and the proof is omitted. It remains to prove Re ≤ R1 + R2 and Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ) − I(X1, X2;Z), see the
followings.
(Proof of Re ≤ R1 +R2) The inequality is obtained by the following equation.
Re ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN ) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2) = R1 +R2. (72)
(Proof of Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)) The proof is obtained by the following (73).
Re ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(W1,W2|ZN )
(a)
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(W1,W2|ZN ) + δ(Pe)−H(W1,W2|ZN , Y N ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(W1,W2;Y
N |ZN ) + δ(Pe))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N |ZN )−H(Y N |ZN ,W1,W2) + δ(Pe))
≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N |ZN )−H(Y N |ZN ,W1,W2, XN1 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
(b)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(Y N |ZN )−H(Y N |ZN , XN1 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(Y N ;XN1 , X
N
2 |ZN ) + δ(Pe))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(Y N ;XN1 , X
N
2 )− I(ZN ;XN1 , XN2 ) + δ(Pe))
= lim
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)
−H(Zi|Zi−1) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i)) + 1
N
δ(Pe))
≤ lim
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)
−H(Zi|Zi−1, Y i−1) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i)) + 1
N
δ(Pe))
(c)
= lim
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)
−H(Zi|Y i−1) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i)) + 1
N
δ(Pe))
(d)
≤ lim
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|X1,i, X2,i)
−H(Zi) +H(Zi|X1,i, X2,i)) + 1
N
δ(Pe))
(e)
≤ lim
N→∞
(H(Y )−H(Y |X1, X2)
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−H(Z) +H(Z|X1, X2) + 1
N
δ(Pe))
= lim
N→∞
(I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z) + 1
N
δ(Pe))
(f)
≤ lim
N→∞
(I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z) + 1
N
δ())
= I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z), (73)
where (a) is from the Fano’s inequality, and (b) is from (W1,W2)→ (ZN , XN2 , XN1 )→ Y N , (c) is from Zi−1 →
Y i−1 → Zi, (d) is from Y i−1 → Yi → Zi, (e) is from the definitions that X1 , (X1,J , J), X2 , (X2,J , J),
Y , YJ , Z , ZJ where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of
X1,i, X2,i, Yi and Zi, and (f) is from Pe ≤ .
The proof of Theorem 10 is completed.
APPENDIX K
PROOF OF THEOREM 12
Theorem 12 is proved by calculating the mutual information terms in C(G)s and C(H)s , see the following.
All the random variables take values in {0, 1}. Let Pr{X1 = 0} = α, Pr{X1 = 1} = 1−α, Pr{X2 = 0} = β
and Pr{X2 = 1} = 1− β. Note that X1, X2, Y and Z satisfy
Y = X1 ·X2, Z = Y ⊕ Z∗, (74)
where X1 is independent of X2, and Pr{Z∗ = 0} = 1− p, Pr{Z∗ = 1} = p.
The joint probability pX1X2Y is calculated by the following (75).
pX1,X2,Y (x1, x2, y) = pY |X1,X2(y|x1, x2)pX1(x1)pX2(x2). (75)
The joint probability pX1X2Z is calculated by the following (76).
pX1,X2,Z(x1, x2, z) =
∑
y
pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X1,X2(y|x1, x2)pX1(x1)pX2(x2). (76)
Then, C(G)s is
C(G)s =
 (R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ h(p)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ h(p)
R1 +R2 ≤ h(p)
 . (77)
Moreover, C(H)s is
C(H)s =
 (R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1
R1 +R2 ≤ h(p)
 . (78)
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It is easy to see that C(G)s and C(H)s are the same for the binary case, and therefore, the secrecy capacity region
for the binary case of degraded MAC-WT with non-cooperative encoders is
R(J) =
 (R1, R2) :
0 ≤ R1 ≤ h(p)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ h(p)
R1 +R2 ≤ h(p)
 . (79)
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